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AFRICAN REGIONAL AGREEMENTS: THEIR IMPACT ON TRADE WITH OR 








The aim of this paper is (i) to assess the impact of regional agreements on members’ trade in Sub-
Saharan Africa (intra-regional trade as well as trade with the rest of the world), controlling for the 
other traditional determinants, including geography and transport costs and (ii) to compare the 
respective effect of the preferential trade agreements and the monetary unions. Considering the period 
1962-1996, we first assess the average impact of each regional agreement on their implementation 
period and second we show how these impacts have evolved. An “augmented” gravity model is 
designed, relying on a transport cost function, in which specific dummies allow trade creation and 
trade diversion effects to be separated. The model is estimated in panel with bilateral specific effects, 
to isolate the non-observable characteristics of each pair of countries, and according to the Hausman-
Taylor (1981) method, which takes into account a possible endogeneity of some explanatory variables. 
During their implementation, the African regional trade agreements have generated a significant 
increase in trade between members, although initially often through trade diversion. In the two 
agreements of the CFA franc zone, the currency unions have largely reinforced the positive effect of 
the corresponding preferential trade agreements on intra-regional trade, while dampening their trade 
diversion effect. Actually, currency unions rather had a trade creation effect (all the more important as 
the international monetary environment has been more unstable), whereas preferential trade 
agreements resulted in important trade diversion. 
 
Résumé 
L’objectif de ce papier est (i) d’évaluer l’impact des accords régionaux d’Afrique Subsaharienne sur le 
commerce de leurs pays membres (commerce intra-regional et commerce avec le reste du monde) une 
fois pris en compte les effets des déterminants traditionnels tels que la géographie et les coûts de 
transports et (ii) de comparer l’effet respectif des accords commerciaux préférentiels et des unions 
monétaires. Sur la période d’étude 1962-1996, deux évaluations sont présentées : celle de l’impact 
moyen de chaque accord régional depuis sa mise en place, et l’évolution dans le temps de ces impacts. 
Des variables muettes permettant d’identifier les créations et détournements de trafic sont introduites 
dans un modèle de gravité “augmenté”, basé sur une fonction de coûts de transport. Le modèle est 
estimé en panel avec introduction d’effets spécifiques bilatéraux afin d’isoler les caractéristiques non 
observables de chaque paire de pays, et selon la méthode de Hausman et Taylor (1981) afin de corriger 
l’endogénéité potentielle de certaines variables explicatives. Les accords régionaux africains ont 
engendré une augmentation significative de commerce entre les pays membres, mais souvent au 
détriment du commerce avec le reste du monde dans les premières années. Dans le cas des deux 
accords de la zone franc CFA, les unions monétaires ont fortement renforcé les effets positifs sur le 
commerce intra-regional des accords commerciaux préférentiels correspondants, tout en compensant 
leurs effets de détournement de commerce. En fait, les unions monétaires ont plutôt eu un effet de 
création de commerce (d’autant plus important que l’environnement monétaire international a été plus 
instable), tandis que les accords commerciaux préférentiels ont conduit à d’importants détournements.  
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Trade of Sub-Saharan African countries is generally considered as rather low and the 
growing marginalisation of African countries in world trade has often been stressed. Numerous 
explanations have been given to this marginalisation, such as the slow growth of economic activities, 
unfavourable geographical factors and inappropriate transport policies (Amjadi and Yeats, 1995, 
Yeats, 1998, Collier and Gunning, 1999, Limao and Venables, 2001) or the failure of the trade policy 
(Collier, 1995, Rodrik, 1998, Yeats 1998). Among the latter, regional agreements have been an 
important component of trade policy in African countries over the last four decades. Two kinds of 
regional agreements are likely to enhance African trade: currency unions and preferential trade 
agreements. There are presently five main African regional areas: the Economic and Monetary Union 
of West Africa (UEMOA), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
1 The first 
two are simultaneously preferential trade areas and monetary unions with a common currency (the 
CFA franc), whereas the three last are only preferential trade areas. So, Africa offers an interesting 
field of analysis to assess the respective impact of monetary and trade agreements and how they 
mutually back each other up. 
 
The relative importance of different factors in trade evolution, including common 
currency, has already been considered in a historical perspective by Estevadeordal et al. (2002): an 
augmented gravity model is used to examine tariffs, transport costs and a “common currency” effect 
through the gold standard as determinants of the rise and fall of world trade for 1870-1939, controlling 
for changes in the scale of world economic activity. In the same way, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) 
have analysed the extent to which trade blocs and currency arrangements were responsible for the 
changing patterns of trade observed in the 1930s among 34 developed and developing countries. In the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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more specific literature on the trade impact of regional integration in the post-World War II period, 
there are numerous studies using as counterfactual a gravity model to assess ex post preferential trade 
agreements (notably Frankel 1997, Endoh 1999, Krueger 1999 or Soloaga and Winters 2001) and 
monetary unions (see for instance Rose, 2000, Rose and Wincoop, 2001, or Frankel and Rose 2002). 
However, few of them have considered African preferential trade agreements (Foroutan and Pritchett, 
1993, Elbadawi 1997, Lyakurwa 1996, Subramanian and Tamirisa 2001, Longo and Sekkat 2001) or 
African monetary unions (Nitsch, 2002), and they do not deal with the issue of the joint effects of a 
common currency and the implementation of a preferential tariff on trade.  
 
The aim of this paper is (i) to assess the impact of regional agreements on members’ trade 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (intra-regional trade as well as trade with the rest of the world), controlling for 
the other traditional determinants, including geography and transport costs and (ii) to compare the 
relative importance of the preferential trade agreements and  the monetary unions in this impact. 
Considering the period 1962-1996, we first assess the average impacts (taking into account the 
implementation period of each regional agreement) and second we demonstrate how these impacts 
have evolved.  
 
As we are interested in the nature of the impact of regional agreement, as well as in its 
size, we consider not only whether the trade between the members of a regional agreement increased 
or not, but also, if it did, whether the increase was mainly a trade diversion (TD) or a trade creation 
(TC), which has very different welfare
2 and development implications, in particular with regard to 
competitiveness. To do that, we introduce three dummies into a gravity model for each regional 
agreement, likely to capture trade creation, import diversion and export diversion respectively. In the 
assessment of two of the main African regional agreements, the UEMOA and the CEMAC, we must 
take into account the specific impact of currency unions on bilateral trade. One of the main channels of 
the currency union on trade being the elimination of the bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 We consider these regional agreements and their antecedents as well (see appendix A.1). For instance, the term UEMOA 
actually covers the UEMOA agreement and its trade antecedents: UDAO, UDEAO and CEAO. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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introduce this variable in the gravity equation in order to distinguish the effects of the trade 
agreements from those of the currency union. 
 
We design an “augmented” gravity model relying on a transport cost function, instead of 
the only distance variable. Hence, we avoid an omitted variable bias, which would be captured by the 
coefficients of the regional agreement dummies and could be particularly important for African 
countries (see Limao and Venables, 2001 or Brun et al., 2002). Whereas all the studies quoted above 
regarding the assessment of African preferential trade agreements in a gravity model are cross 
sectional analyses, we estimate the model in panel, with bilateral specific effects to isolate the non-
observable characteristics of each pair of countries which can influence their bilateral trade (such as a 
common language, historical links, etc.). In former studies, this impact could be partly captured by 
variables related to African regional agreements. Moreover, we estimate the model according to the 
Hausman-Taylor (1981) method, which enables us to take into account a possible endogeneity of some 
explanatory variables. The estimation is also corrected for a potential selection bias.  
 
The main conclusions of the paper are the following: (i) the African regional agreements 
have succeeded in enhancing intra-regional trade, (ii) those combining preferential tariff and common 
currency components are the most efficient in increasing intra-regional trade, (iii) the two components 
have, on average, an equal contribution in additive intra-regional trade, but (iv) currency unions have 
rather a trade creation effect (all the more important as the international monetary environment is more 
unstable), whereas preferential trade agreements evidence trade diversion.  
 
Section 2 recalls the traditional gains of preferential trade agreements and currency 
unions as well as their relevance for African countries. Section 3 presents the augmented gravity 
model used to assess the African regional agreements. Section 4 specifies the econometric model and 
presents the evaluations of the average effect of each African regional agreement since its 
implementation. We compare these results for regional agreements with and without a common 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2 For an exhaustive survey on members’ welfare effects that can be expected from African trade blocs, see Gunning (2001). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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currency and, in the case of the UEMOA and CEMAC, we try to untangle the respective impacts of 
trade and monetary unions. In section 5, the average effect demonstrated in section 4 is divided into 
three-year sub-periods and we interpret the part of the evolutions induced by the implementation of 
preferential tariffs and by changes in the relative monetary union advantage. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.   ARE THE TRADITIONAL GAINS OF REGIONAL AGREEMENTS RELEVANT FOR AFRICA? 
 
Any ex post assessment of regional agreement on trade flows should consider whether, 
following its implementation, trade creation (TC) or trade diversion (TD), according to Viner’s 
traditional model (1950), dominates. To answer we propose to compare the impact of regional 
agreement on the evolution of two different variables: the intra-regional trade and the imports of the 
members from the rest of the world (ROW)
3. A third variable considered is the evolution of members’ 
exports to the ROW: it enables us to observe if the regional agreement induces an increase in the 
members’ competitiveness
4 or if the increased trade between the members are only a diversion of 
export flows previously oriented to the ROW.
5 
 
Of course, the potential intra-regional trade in SSA seems to be quite low, because these 
countries have similar patterns of trade, as shown by Yeats (1998) with Michaely’s index of trade 
complementarity
 6. However, several empirical studies (see Foroutan and Pritchett, 1993, Rodrik, 
1998) show that this intra-SSA trade exists and could be developed by the reduction of trade barriers. 
Yeats (1998) underlines this potential in sectors such as food products (which represent 14% of the 
global imports of SSA countries), especially since some African countries have a comparative 
advantage in the production and export of these goods. Moreover, as noted by Guillaumont P. and S. 
(1993) for several types of goods (food, industrial or craft industrial goods) which are both produced 
                                                           
3 Under pure TC, intra-regional trade increases and imports from the ROW remain unchanged; under pure TD, the increase in 
intra-regional trade is entirely offset by a corresponding decrease on imports from the ROW; if there is both TC and TD, 
intra-regional trade increases more than imports from the ROW decrease.  
4 from more dynamic gains of the regional agreement, such as the increase in competition inside the area, or the benefits due 
to economies of scale on the regional market. 
5 an increase of this third variable signifying an improvement in welfare for non-members (see Winters, 1997). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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in Africa and imported from the ROW, the potential for intra-SSA trade is demonstrated by significant 
informal trade. Hence, the African preferential trade agreements or currency unions are likely to 
induce an increase in the official (or registered) trade between partners, even if this increase is only 
small. 
 
Enhancing intra-regional trade may result in trade diversion (TD) as well as trade creation 
(TC). According to Viner’s analysis (1950), or that of Kemp and Wan (1976) relative to preferential 
trade agreements, in order to limit the risk of TD and the associated loss of welfare, the members must 
not increase their tariffs on imports from the ROW. Because of the importance of the revenue accruing 
from customs tariffs in the SSA countries’ budgets, there is a pressure to compensate for the loss of 
tariff revenue due to trade preferences by an increase in the tariffs on imports from the ROW. Then, if 
custom tariffs increase and some partners produce goods previously imported from the ROW and 
highly protected, there will be TD, inefficient industries becoming “competitive” on the regional 
market. According to Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2000), this scheme is accentuated in SSA 
because of the considerable difference in size of member countries (Côte d’Ivoire in the UEMOA, 
Cameroon in the CEMAC, Nigeria in the ECOWAS, etc.) and the “dominant” country is usually (i) 
the most industrialized of the group, (ii) the country with the highest customs tariffs, and (iii) 
sometimes the only producer. Hence, there is a risk of TD, because the dominant country is less 
effective than the world’s suppliers. 
 
Thus, whereas the trade patterns of SSA countries suggest that the potential TC from 
these preferential trade agreements is low, the characteristics of their economy (existence of a revenue 
constraint, asymmetry between the countries, small size of each regional bloc, and their tariffs 
schemes) suggest that they may result in large TD.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 The average value of this index is 9 for SSA countries, whereas it was approximately 53.4 for the EU when this agreement 
was set up. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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We assume that the nature of the impact of currency unions may be different. We can 
expect a currency union to reinforce trade between members, making transactions easier and more 
beneficial since it lowers transaction costs by means of a common currency, as well as the risks, 
thanks to the absence of exchange rate volatility. As in the case of the preferential tariff 
implementation, this additional intra-trade can go along with a positive or negative additional trade 
with the ROW, as the common currency may act as a protection, enhancing the comparative advantage 
for intra-regional trade. However, TD due to a common currency is not equivalent, in terms of welfare, 
to TD due to a preferential tariff as this reorientation of trade is generated by a real decrease in 
domestic costs (as the transaction costs decrease on the intra-regional trade) and does not lead to a loss 
in government tariff revenue. 
 
The members’ trade pattern with the ROW can also depend on the exchange rate regime 
chosen by the monetary union as it may influence the volatility of the external exchange rate. In the 
case of the UEMOA and the CEMAC, the two respective single currencies (which have the same 
acronym, CFA franc) have been pegged to the French franc and are now pegged to the euro. As the 
main trade partners of the member countries are the European ones, this peg induces a small average 
volatility of bilateral nominal exchange rates. Let us compare the sample
7 mean of the bilateral 
nominal exchange rate volatility over 1962-1996 for three groups: 4.2% for the world except for the 
countries belonging to currency unions, 2.1% if only one of the two countries belongs to the UEMOA, 
1.9% if only one of the two countries belongs to the CEMAC. Hence, currency unions in SSA have 
reduced the members’ exchange rate volatility with the ROW, compared to the volatility for countries 
non-members of a currency union. This concurs with the conclusion of Savvides (1996), who 
examines the variability of nominal and real exchange rates of the members of the CFA Franc Zone by 
comparing it with those of other African countries. With regard to the nominal exchange rate, he 
concludes that (i) nominal exchange rate variability increased during the flexible exchange rate period 
for all countries, but (ii) Zone members experienced lower nominal variability in comparison with that 
of non-members. This lower volatility gives a relative advantage in trade with ROW to the members of CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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the UEMOA
8 and the CEMAC. So, we can expect to have a dominant TC effect of the currency 
unions, as TD is all the more likely as exchange rate volatility with the ROW is high.   
 
Finally, the convertibility regime of the CFA franc may also lower the risk of TD, since it 
makes transactions with the ROW easier and safer as convertibility is guaranteed by France through 
the establishment, by each regional central bank in the CFA franc zone, of an operation account with 
an -in principle- unlimited overdraft facility for each central bank (see Hadjimichael and Galy, 1997). 
Moreover, when the neighbouring countries do not have a convertible currency, they are induced to 
export to the monetary unions in order to obtain convertible CFA francs
9.  
 
3.   THE GRAVITY MODEL DESIGNED TO ASSESS AFRICAN REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
The simplest way to assess ex post effects of preferential agreements is to observe the 
evolution of the partners and of the ROW in the global imports or exports of the area. The implicit 
counterfactual is that, without any agreement, these parts should not change. According to several 
studies on African preferential trade agreements
10, not only was the part of intra-group exports in the 
global exports of the countries of the area very slight when the agreement was implemented, but it also 
failed to rise after the agreement came into effect.  
But the failure of African regional agreements cannot be the only explanation of these 
disappointing results. African countries had to face important handicaps that other countries did not 
necessarily encounter, in terms of competitiveness, due to a lack of infrastructure, unfavourable 
geography, small GDP, etc. Hence, the analysis in terms of market share can be misleading: to assess 
regional agreements, one has to compare the evolution of trade with a counterfactual which predicts 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 described in section 4 and in appendix A.4. 
8 For a study of the relation of exchange rate volatility and trade with ROW in the case of the UEMOA, see Laporte (1996). 
9 This effect may have been dampened since mid-1993 when the central banks of the two CFA monetary unions decided to 
no longer change CFA notes presented outside the two respective unions. 
10 de Melo, Montenegro and Panagariya (1993): table 4 p.23; Foroutan and Pritchett (1993): table 1 p.77; Yeats (1998): table 
3.2 p.27. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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what would have happened, had there been no preferential tariff and no common currency, taking into 
account these factors. This is why we estimate the counterfactual by a gravity model. 
 
3.1. Assessment of regional agreements with an “augmented” gravity model 
 
We use the standard “generalized” gravity equation developed by Deardorff (1998) (see 
appendix A.3), adapted to panel data, with a conventional modification: the introduction of the 
population (and then implicitly the income per capita) of the importing country, to capture the Engel 
effects, and of the exporting country, to control for factor endowment differences (as done by Frankel, 
1997, or Soloaga and Winters, 2001). Then, the log-linear gravity equation is:  
 
lnMijt= γ0 + γ1 lnYit+ γ2 lnYjt+ γ3 lnNit+ γ4 lnNjt+ γ5 lnθijt+ γ6 ln i DIST +γ7 lnRERijt+ηijt  (1) 
 
Mijt: volume of imports of country i from country j; 
Yi(j)t: GDP of country i (j), and γ1(2) is expected to be equal to unity (see appendix A.3);  
Ni(j)t: population of country i (j), and γ3(4) is expected to be negative; 
θijt : transport costs between i and j, γ5 is expected to be negative
11; 
i DIST : average distance of the importing country i from its main partners, weighted by the share of 
exporters’ GDP in world GDP, introduced beside the absolute distance (see the transport costs 
function below) to take account of “the relative distance of i from suppliers” (the “remoteness”), γ6 is 
expected to be positive. 
RERijt : bilateral real exchange rate, γ7 is expected to be negative. 
 
The usual assumption of the gravity model, namely that transport costs, θijt, are a positive 
function of the distance between two countries (DISTij), sometimes supplemented by the assumption 
of an impact of a common border (Lij), is not satisfactory: Limao and Venables (2001) emphasize, 
with a gravity equation estimation, that distance explains only 10% of the change in the transport CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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costs. Poor road infrastructures represent 40% of the transport costs predicted for coastal countries and 
60% for landlocked countries. This is especially relevant for African countries where transport costs 
seem to be particularly high, even for a given distance, because of location and poor infrastructure (see 
Amjadi and Yeats, 1995, Collier and Gunning, 1999). Therefore, in order to avoid potential bias in our 
assessment of African regional agreements, we model θijt as follows: 
 
Lnθijt = α0 + [α1 lnDISTij + α2 Lij ]+ [α3 Ei + α4 lnINit ]+ [α5 Ej + α6 lnINjt ]+ ωijt           (2) 
 
DISTij: distance between the countries i and j (α1>0);  
Lij=1 if i and j share a common border, otherwise 0 (α2<0); 
Ei(j)=1 if the country i (j) is landlocked; otherwise 0 (α3>0, α5>0);  
INi(j)t: level of infrastructure of the country i (j), computed as an average of the density of road, railway 
and the number of telephone lines per capita (α4<0, α6<0).  
 
We substitute (2) in (1), and the reduced form of the model is: 
 
lnMijt= β0 + β1 lnYit+ β2 lnYjt+ β3 lnNit+ β4 lnNjt+ β5 lnDISTij+ β6 ln i DIST  
+ β7 Lij+ β8 Ei+ β9 lnINit+ β10 Ej+ β11 lnINjt+ β12 lnRERijt+ηijt       (3) 
 
with expected signs: β1>0, β2>0, β3<0, β4<0, β5= γ5.α1 <0, β6>0, β7= γ5.α4 >0, β8= γ5.α5<0,  
β9= γ5.α2 >0, β10= γ5.α6 <0, β11= γ5.α3 >0, β12<0. 
 
3.2. Identifying trade creation, import diversion and export diversion 
 
The effect of regional agreements on trade can now be assessed with regard to the “norm” 
defined in equation (3). As done by Endoh (1999) and Soloaga and Winters (2001), we introduce three 
dummies by agreement, capturing the three variables of interest emphasized in section 2 respectively: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11 and equal to -σ, σ representing the elasticity of substitution across suppliers. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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(i)  Intra-bloc trade: DI=1 if both partners i and j belong to the same regional agreement, 
otherwise 0. 
(ii)  Imports of the regional agreement members from the ROW: DM=1 if the importing 
country i belongs to the regional agreement and if the exporting country j belongs to the ROW;  
(iii)  Exports of the regional agreement members towards the ROW: DX=1 if j belongs to 
the regional agreement and if i belongs to the ROW.  
We note αI , αM and αX the coefficients associated respectively with DI, DM and DX. 
Hence, regional agreement generates essentially: 
(i)  TC if the intra-regional trade increases without decrease in the imports from the ROW, 
i.e. if αI>0 and αM=0;  
(ii)  “Imports diversion” if the propensity to import from the ROW decreases whereas the 
global propensity to trade with the other members increases, i.e. if αI>0 and αM<0;  
(iii)  In the same way, there is an “exports diversion” if αI>0 and αX<0. 
 
3.3. Taking into account specific effects of currency unions 
 
To assess the relative effectiveness of preferential trade and monetary agreements for 
boosting regional trade, we successively do two kinds of analysis.  
 
First, we compare the impact of regional agreements which are only based on preferential 
tariffs (ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC) and the impact of the UEMOA and the CEMAC which first 
were currency unions. Indeed, the coefficients relative to the dummies representing these last two 
unions capture both preferential trade and currency union impacts. 
 
Second, we try to capture the respective impact of the two aspects (commercial and 
monetary) of the regional cooperation of the UEMOA and the CEMAC. According to this aim, we 
cannot capture these effects by the introduction of a currency union dummy, as done by Rose (2000), 
Frankel and Rose (2002), or Rose and Wincoop (2001): since 1994, the countries covered by the CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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UEMOA and the CEMAC dummies are exactly the same countries as those belonging to the 
respective currency unions and, in our sample, the differences before 1994 are too small to distinguish 
the effect of the currency union and of the preferential trade agreement with dummies
12. However, the 
effect of the stability of the exchange rate (perfect within the union, differentiated with the ROW due 
to the choice of the exchange rate regime) can be controlled for by the introduction in the gravity 
model of the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate between i and j at time t, VOLijt. The 
latter is measured by the standard deviation of the first-difference of the monthly bilateral nominal 
exchange rate (in logarithm) for the year preceding period t (e.g. Frankel, 1997, Rose, 2000 and 
Estevadeordal et al., 2002). Hence, the coefficients of the regional dummies are now purged from the 
positive effect of the currency union due to the stability of the nominal exchange rate, and then more 
closely measure the impact of the preferential trade agreement. It might be recognized that this method 
does not control for the reduction in the transaction costs due to the common currency and the 
dummies coefficients may still capture this effect. However, the specific bilateral effect introduced in 
the estimation takes into account this impact of the common currency, as far as it is constant. 
 
 
4.   SIGNIFICANT AVERAGE EFFECTS OF EACH AFRICAN REGIONAL AGREEMENT ON 
TRADE. 
 
Our first estimations concern the whole period of implementation of each regional agreement 
and allow us to assess their average trade impact. 
 
4.1. Data and econometric method 
 
                                                           
12 The differences for 1962-1993, in terms of members, are: 
(i) between the UDEAC (appendix A.1) and the BEAC area (franc CFA): Equatorial Guinea for 1983-1985 (1983 in the 
UDEAC and 1985 in the BEAC) and Chad for 1968-1984 (when it left the UDEAC but not the BEAC); 
(ii) between the CEAO (appendix A.1) and the BCEAO area (franc CFA): Mauritania (in the CEAO but not in the BCEAO) 
contrary to Togo (not in the CEAO but in the BCEAO) and more ambiguously, before 1984, Mali (in the CEAO but not in 
the BCEAO, although in the franc zone) contrary to Benin (not in the CEAO but in the BCEAO).  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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The trade data are from UN-COMTRADE, which gives the total bilateral imports as 
declared by the importing country, from 1962 to 1996
13. The sources of the explanatory variable data 
and their computations are presented in appendix A.2. To obtain a relevant norm for the assessment of 
the African regional agreements effects, we eliminate from the sample the trade between OECD 
countries, mainly compounded by intra-industrial trade
14. The effective sample covers around 150 
countries, including 131 developing countries (see appendix A.4). There are thus 225,452 observations 
(around 50% of the potential trade data
15 over the period 1962-1996), of which 12,018 refer to trade 
between SSA countries.  
 
Panel data enables one to control for every unobservable factor specific to the importing 
or exporting countries that influence the level of bilateral trade (e.g. historical, cultural, ethnic, 
political or geographical factors). Hence, the inclusion of bilateral specific effects in the gravity model 
ensures that the regional dummies really isolate TD and TC effects
16. These bilateral effects are 
modelled as random variables, as a fixed-effects model is inadequate
17. However, variables like GDP 
or infrastructure may be correlated with the random specific effects. The usual way to deal with this 
issue is to consider the instrumental variables estimation proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). If 
X (Z) denotes the variables variant (invariant) over time, with X1 (X2), the exogenous (endogenous) 
variables, we use the instruments [QX1,QX2,PX1,Z]
 18, as suggested by Breusch, Mizon and Schmidt 
(1989)
19. The time effects are introduced as fixed parameters. 
 
                                                           
13 The countries which do not declare their imports from a partner or which do not import from this partner are identified in 
the same way, with a missing value. Hence, our data are not censored at zero.  
14 However, comparative estimations will be made (i) over the total database, (ii) over the trade flows between developing 
countries, and (iii) over the exchanges between only African countries. 
15 we consider a potential selection bias in estimations. 
16 It has been shown (see Matyas, 1997 or Carrère, 2002) that not taking heterogeneity into account in bilateral trade 
relations introduces a bias in the coefficients of regional dummies. 
17 the “Within” transformation removes variables, such as distance, common border or some regional dummies, which are 
time invariant. 
18 Here, Q is a matrix which obtains the deviations from individual means, and P is a matrix which averages the observations 
across time for each individual. 
19 Because the resulting estimator is consistent but not efficient, as it is not corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, we follow the suggestion of Hausman and Taylor (1981) and use the first-round of estimates to compute the 
variance of the specific effects and the variance of the error term. This method has been used for a gravity equation by Brun 
et al. (2002), Egger (2002), or Carrère (2002). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
  15  
As the unbalanced sample can be subject to a non-ignorable selection rule
20, to correct the 
presence of a selection bias we add three variables to the equation (following the method proposed by 
Nijman and Verbeek, 1992): (i) PRES: number of years of presence of the couple ij in the sample, (ii) 
DD=1 if the couple ij is observed during the entire period, 0 otherwise. (iii) PAt=1 if the couple ij was 
present in t-1. As shown in Table 1 below, these variables are significant and so systematically 
introduced in future regressions, in order to avoid the selection bias. 
 
4.2. Global impact of African Regional Agreements over the period 1962-1996 
 
For each regional agreement (CEMAC, UEMOA, ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC) and 
their antecedents, we introduce the three dummies
21 needed to evaluate TC and TD in imports and 
exports. To improve the reference norm: 
(i) we also consider the impact of three non-African regional agreements, evidenced in 
empirical analysis as having some trade effects on their respective members (see Frankel, 1997, 
Soloaga and Winters, 2001 or Carrère, 2002): MERCOSUR, ASEAN and ANDEAN (defined in 
appendix A.1); 
(ii) we control for membership of the Yaoundé (1963, 1969) and Lomé (1975, 1980, 
1985, 1990) Conventions, which actually changed from 17 to 68 South countries and from 6 to 15 
European countries. The dummy “YL” takes the value 1 if the importing country is a member of the 
European Community or Union (EU) and if the exporting country is an EAMA
22 until 1974 and an 
ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) since 1975
23. Actually, most of the members of African regional 
agreements belong to the ACP group, which could influence the orientation and structure of their 
trade, in particular in their exports to the ROW.  
                                                           
20 i.e. the probability of a pair of countries being included in the sample is not independent of model error, and in particular 
to the random bilateral specific effects. 
21 These dummies are modified over the period to capture, from the date of creation of the regional agreements, possible 
changes in members (see appendix A.1). 
22 EAMA: “Etats Africains et Malgache Associés” of the Conventions of Yaoundé (all French-speaking former Belgian and 
French dependences). 
23 We do not consider a symmetrical impact on the imports of the ACP countries from EU because the Lomé Conventions do 
not include reciprocal arrangements and even in the Yaoundé Convention, the reciprocity was actually mitigated by many 
exceptions. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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The results are reported in column 1 of table 1 (i.e. without VOLijt). A Hausman test, 
based on differences between Within and GLS estimators, reveals correlation between the bilateral 
specific effects and explanatory variables. Hence, the use of the Hausman-Taylor method is justified. 
To identify the variables correlated with the specific effects, we estimate several regressions with 
different sets of endogenous variables
24. According to the over-identification test, three sources of 
correlation are identified: the GDP variables (Yit and Yjt), country size (Nit and Njt) and the variables 
of infrastructure (INit and INjt).  
 
Coefficients for the traditional gravity variables are all significant at a 1% level (except 
for the landlockness of country i, Ei) and have the expected sign: the volume of bilateral imports 
increases with the GDP with an impact close to unity, the population has a negative (positive) sign for 
the exporting (importing) country and the distance trade impact is superior to unity (-1.23). Moreover, 
imports increase with the level of infrastructure of each country; sharing a common land border allows 
countries to trade 2.5 times more than predicted from the gravity equation
25 (=exp(0.91)) and the 
exports of a landlocked country are 27% below what might be expected. Finally, a real depreciation of 
the currency of country i against country j lowers its imports from j. Similar coefficients are reported 
in the literature (e.g. Frankel, 1997, Limao and Venables, 2001, Soloaga and Winters, 2001). 
 
Table 1 here: Results for global regional agreement dummies of the panel estimation, 1962-1996. 
 
The coefficient for the Conventions of Yaoundé and Lomé (“YL” dummy) is 
significantly positive: the ACP exports toward the EU were 2.3 times higher than predicted from the 
gravity model over the period. Results for ASEAN, MERCOSUR and ANDEAN are in accordance 
with the findings obtained with a gravity equation by Frankel (1997), Krueger (1999), Soloaga and 
Winters (2001) and Carrère (2002).  
 
                                                           
24 Available upon request.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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Coefficients reflecting intra-regional trade are significantly positive for all the regional 
agreements (except for COMESA): coefficient for intra-CEMAC (UEMOA) trade indicates that 
members traded 3.25 (3.13) times more among themselves, over the period 1962-1996, than the 
expected level and the SADC members 3.5 times more since it was created in 1980. Intra-ECOWAS 
trade has on average been 22% above the norm since it was created in 1975. Members’ imports from 
the ROW are 38%, 43% and 45% below the norm for the UEMOA, the CEMAC and the SADC 
respectively, but conform to the norm for COMESA and are even higher than the norm for ECOWAS. 
Finally, all the African regional agreements, except in the case of SADC, show members’ exports 




Hence, according to the first column in table 1, between 1962 and 1996, the members of 
the UEMOA and the CEMAC trade over three times more among themselves than expected, which is 
considerably higher than the other regional agreements with only preferential trade agreements (except 
for the SADC). 
 
4.3. UEMOA and CEMAC: Effect of the Trade Agreement or of the Currency Union? 
 
What are the respective roles of the preferential trade agreement and the currency union 
in this additive intra-regional trade? To deal with this issue, the nominal exchange rate volatility 
between i and j at time t, VOLijt is introduced in the gravity model. As reported in table 1, column 2, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25 i.e. more than for countries not sharing a common border. 
26 A comparison of these results to the existing studies on African regional agreements is complex because of differences in 
the sample used and the period considered. Several papers use a long sample period but with a different set of countries from 
ours. For instance, Lyakurwa (1996) and Longo and Sekkat (2001) look at intra-SSA trade for the periods 1980-1992 and 
1980-1997 respectively, and Subramanian and Tamirisa (2001) add an estimation on bilateral trade between all the available 
countries for 1980-1997. In order to compare our results, we present in appendix A.5 the same regressions as table 1 column 
1 but on different samples. The African regional agreement dummy coefficients are robust compared to table 1, and they are 
quite different from those obtained by the authors quoted above, certainly due to the difference in the definition of the 
dummy variables and in the econometric method used, all of the previous studies being cross-country analysis with an OLS 
estimator. Other papers on African regional agreements, such as Elbadawi (1997), Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) and Laporte 
(1996), raise the same problems. As the periods of these studies are shorter, comparisons will be made with our sub-period 
regressions. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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this variable has a strong negative effect on bilateral trade: since the sample mean of VOLijt is 0.042
27 
and its standard deviation is 0.1, reducing exchange rate volatility by one standard deviation around its 
mean (from 0.1 to 0) increases the bilateral trade by an average of 5.1% 
28 for 1962-1996. Previous 
results are all unchanged except the coefficients for Lij and for the Yaoundé and Lomé Convention 
(“YL”), which are reduced by half (but still significant) as a result of a lower volatility between 
neighbours and within the parties of the “YL” conventions (see later). 
 
To check whether the results are sensitive to our measure of the exchange rate volatility, 
two alternative indicators are experimented: (i) the standard deviation of the level of the exchange rate 
(in logarithmic form) during the preceding year (VOL2ijt), (ii) the standard deviation of the first-
difference of the monthly bilateral nominal exchange rate (in logarithmic form) in the five years 
preceding the period t (VOL3ijt). The exchange rate volatility coefficient is robustly negative and 
significant and the regional dummy coefficients are also robust and retain their size.
29  
 
Members of the UEMOA and the CEMAC now trade twice as much (instead of three 
times) among themselves as predicted by the gravity model over 1962-1996. Hence, if we assume that, 
once controlled for (non) exchange rate volatility, the coefficients for intra-regional trade only capture 
the effect of a preferential trade agreement, it appears that 51% (56%) of the average additive intra-
UEMOA (CEMAC) trade observed in column 1 can be attributed to the preferential trade agreement 
and then 49.4% (44%) to the currency union. This result is in accordance with Nitsch’s (2002) 
conclusions
30 that countries of the CFA zone trade, at best, about 55% more with each other than with 
an otherwise similar non-monetary union member in West and Central Africa. 
 
It remains that the share attributed to the currency union is certainly underestimated as the 
preferential trade agreement coefficients in column 2 may still capture some trade-enhancing effects of 
                                                           
27 pairs of countries that share the same currency (and so have VOLijt=0) are excluded for this computation. 
28 [(e
(-0.494)*(-0.1)]-1)*100 
29 We also test for the correlation between VOLijt and the bilateral random effects. The instrumentation for this variable does 
not change the previous results (with a coefficient equal to -0.484). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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a currency union such as lower transaction costs. However, this bias is reduced since a part of these 
transaction costs (such as the absence of foreign currency conversion costs) may be considered as a 
constant feature of the bilateral trade between members for 1962-1996
31 and so it is partly captured by 
the specific bilateral effects introduced in the gravity model.  
 
With regard to UEMOA and CEMAC trade with the ROW, there are also changes in the 
results compared to column 1 with a significant augmentation of the imports diversion, and a smaller 
one for the exports (non-significant in the case of the CEMAC). Hence, the currency unions in SSA 
have dampened the TD effect generated by the corresponding preferential trade agreement: once 
controlled for the impact of the common currency on trade (through the zero exchange rate volatility), 
the coefficients for DM  and DX  increased (in absolute value)
 32. Then, we find the expected impact 
noted in section 2 for the SSA case: the currency unions in the CFA zones have rather a TC
33 effect 
whereas the preferential trade agreements have a TD one.  
 
5.   CONTRASTED EVOLUTIONS OF THE IMPACT OF AFRICAN REGIONAL AGREEMENTS 
 
A more detailed analysis of these regional agreements can be presented, breaking down 
the regional dummies into three year sub-periods. Actually, the preferential trade agreements 
considered in this paper have evolved over the period (due to progressive preferential tariffs) and have 
not always been operational. Concerning the currency unions, as underlined in section 3, they have 
been a constant feature for the UEMOA and the CEMAC members since 1962. However, they can 
influence the evolution of the dummies relative to (i) intra-regional trade as, when the variability of 
nominal exchange rates between the UEMOA (CEMAC) and the ROW increases, the relative 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
30 But lower than those underlined by Rose (2000), Frankel and Rose (2002) or Rose and Wincoop (2001), who all conclude 
on trade over three times higher between members of a currency union. 
31 except for Equatorial Guinea, which joined the BEAC in 1985, and more ambiguously for Mali, which joined the BCEAO 
in 1984, but which was already in the franc zone before. 
32Another example of this CFA advantage is given by the reduction of the “YL” coefficient when VOLijt is introduced: the 
ACP exports towards the EU are “only” 62% above the norm, instead of 129% in the previous estimations (without VOLijt in 
column 1). It may be due to the importance of the CFA in the ACP group, the CFA being in fixed parity with the French 
franc and stable against the European currencies since 1973 (the sample mean of VOLijt is 2.6% if “YL”=1). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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advantage of the exchange rate stability between members is reinforced
34 and (ii) trade between 
members and ROW, as the currency unions may reduce the variability of nominal exchange rates of 
the members of the CFA Franc Zone with the ROW in comparison with that of non-members.  
 
The evolution of the estimated coefficients of DI, DM and DX of each regional agreement 
are represented in figures 1-4 and 6-8
35. In the case of the UEMOA and the CEMAC, two sets of 
estimated coefficients of DI and DM are graphed in figures 1-4:  
(i) the trade impact of the global regional agreement (i.e. sum of the impact of the 
preferential trade agreement and the currency union), noted RA in figures and corresponding to the 
decomposition of the estimations reported in table 1, column 1; 
(ii) the trade impact of the only preferential trade agreement component, noted PTA in 
figures and corresponding to the decomposition of the estimations reported in table 1, column 2 (with 
the introduction of VOLijt). 
 
5.1. UEMOA and CEMAC: respective roles of the Preferential Trade Agreement and Currency 
Union in the evolution of intra-Regional trade. 
 
Insert figures 1-2 here 
 
From figures 1 and 2, we note some likenesses between the intra-regional trade evolution 
of the UEMOA and the CEMAC over the period.  
 
At first, the intra-regional trade increased, until 1976 for the UEMOA and 1979 for the 
CEMAC. The preferential trade agreements clearly had an important influence on this global 
evolution. This corresponds to the implementation period of new preferential tariffs, induced 
respectively in the two regional areas by the creation of (i) the UDEAO (Customs Union of West 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
33 Corresponding to the more general conclusion of Rose (2000), Estevadeordal et al. (2002) and Frankel and Rose (2002) 
who suggest that the main effect of currency unions on bilateral trade seems to be a TC. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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African States) in 1966 and the CEAO (West African Economic Community) in 1973 and (ii) the 
UDEAC (Central African Customs and Economic Union), created in 1964
36, and its revision in 1973. 
However, the currency unions also influenced this increase in intra-regional trade: over the sub-period 
1971-1979, around 30% of changes is due to the monetary components. To understand this 
phenomenon, we graphed in figure 5 the evolution of the sample mean of VOLijt on the same three 
groups as in section 2: the world (except currency unions), only one of the two countries belonging to 
the UEMOA, only one of the two countries belonging to the CEMAC. The exchange rate volatility, 
low in the 1960s, was higher in the 1970s for the three groups. Then, the relative advantage of the 
exchange rate stability between members has increased, which may have enhanced intra-regional 
trade. 
 
Insert figure 5: Evolution of exchange rate volatility (VOLijt) 
 
Subsequently, the impact of trade between members tended to decrease during the 
1980’s, always remaining significant in the case of the UEMOA but disappearing in the case of the 
CEMAC. Several factors can explain this decline. On the side of preferential trade agreements, this 
decreasing impact of the CEAO
37 and the UDEAC on trade was partly due to the particular 
conjuncture of the end of the 1970’s: once the raw material prices had increased, the countries adopted 
a more nationalistic development strategy and in particular an industrialization policy by import 
substitution at the national (and not regional) level. Then, in the middle of the 1980’s, the structural 
adjustment policies implemented in these countries didn’t take into account the regional requirements, 
which may have had negative effects on regional integration
38. Finally, the mechanisms of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
34 Other features of the bilateral relation between members of the UEMOA and of the CEMAC over the entire period, such 
as the advantage of the lower costs due to the use of a common currency, are stable and then may not influence the evolution. 
35 In the figures, a non-significant coefficient is set equal to zero. 
36 in the continuation of the UDE (Equatorial Customs Union, 1959) 
37 This observation is similar to Elbadawi’s conclusions (1997) which suggest there would be a decrease in the coefficient of 
the intra-CEAO trade dummy between 1980-1985 and 1986-1990. 
38 The structural adjustment policies can have a positive impact on trade (and then on intra-regional trade) as they aim at 
reforming the incentives system, maintaining monetary and fiscal discipline, and reducing discriminations and impediments 
to competition and trade. But these policies can also go against long term integration and defeat regional cooperation at the 
objectives level (dismantling of the selective policies, unilateral tariff reductions which dampen the relative preferences 
granted to the partner countries, fiscal arbitrage against regional institution financing, etc.) as well as at the implementation 
level (implementation of the structural adjustment policies at a national level, with different schedules, over different periods CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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redistribution of gains and losses of customs revenue inside the communities were blocked because 
there were some problems in managing the compensation funds between the countries. In the CEAO, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal had stopped contributing. In 1988, the UDEAC was considered as non-
existent and the countries stopped the payment of contributions
39. Simultaneously, the role of the 
monetary unions decreased, probably due to the relative stability of the nominal exchange rate 
volatility between the CFA franc zone members and the ROW during this period (see figure 5). 
However, the role of the monetary component in the decline of intra-trade is probably underestimated, 
as another factor of this decline can be the crisis of the payment system in the monetary unions during 
the 1980’s, a factor still captured by the preferential trade agreement dummies. 
 
Finally, at the beginning of the 1990’s, the countries decided to restart the regional 
integration process and, in 1994, to implement the UEMOA and the CEMAC: there was an increase in 
intra-trade, even once the effect of the CFA devaluation is controlled for by the RER variable. Once 
again, this evolution is essentially induced by the preferential trade agreement component, which can 
nevertheless capture a monetary union aspect: the improvement in the payment system
40 in the CFA 
zone during this period. 
 
Hence, with regard to the evolution of intra-regional trade, two conclusions stand out: (i) 
during each three-year period, intra-regional trade development is actually simultaneously due to both 
aspects of regional integration and (ii) the monetary component is all the more important as the 
international monetary environment becomes more unstable. However, as trade integration policies 
have been fluctuant, contrary to the monetary component of the unions, the observed changes in intra-
regional trade is mainly explained by the “stop and go” of the preferential trade integration 
implementation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and often only partially, which can generate some regional problems due to the non-coordination of these policies and some 
speculative behaviours which may enhance informal intra-regional trade). For more details about problems of coordinating 
structural adjustment policies and the regional integration process over the entire period, cf. Coussy and Hugon (chap. VII, 
1993), M’Bet (1997), and table 3 p. 172 in Hugon (2001). 
39 Elbadawi (1997) and Lyakurwa (1996) also observed this dysfunction in their estimations. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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5.2. UEMOA and CEMAC: respective roles of the Preferential Trade Agreement and Currency 
Union in the evolution of trade with the ROW. 
 
Insert figures 3-4 here 
 
According to figures 3 and 4, until the end of the 1970’s, the continual increase in trade 
between the members of the regional unions was combined with a significant import diversion
41, 
entirely generated by the preferential trade agreement component. This TD may be explained by the 
fact that (i) members maintained their customs revenue by increasing their tariffs on the imports from 
the ROW, (ii) one of the aims of the preferential taxes for regional products was to develop imports 
from the area. However, contrary to the CEAO, we could expect from the UDEAC common external 
tariff that it limits the appearance of TD. Nevertheless, |αM| are equivalent to (or even higher than) that 
of the CEAO. Actually, even the definition of the implemented common external tariff explains this 
result: one of its components was set at the national level and so was used to offset the custom revenue 
losses due to the harmonization of other customs tariffs, and to ensure minimum protection for 
domestic industry
42. Hence, as for the CEAO, tariffs on imports from ROW varied across members 
and was often higher than the former one, favouring the TD. 
 
During the 1980’s, the TD phenomenon generated by the regional agreements decreased 
(i) progressively, until it disappeared at the beginning of the 1990’s in the case of the UEMOA and (ii) 
suddenly, becoming non-significantly different from zero as of 1983 in the case of the CEMAC. The 
monetary unions played an important (but non-exclusive) part in this TD decline. Actually, even if the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
40 the two regional central banks have established inter-bank money markets and new central bank financial instruments. The 
CFA franc countries have also intensified their efforts to restore the financial health of their banking systems through the 
restructuring, privatisation, and liquidation of insolvent commercial banks, see Hadjimichael and Galy (1997). 
41 Note that the change in the evolution of the RTA exports towards the ROW (figures not reported here) is less obvious. 
This may be due to the presence of the “YL” dummy which already includes all the exports of the UEMOA and the CEMAC 
countries towards the European countries and hence a significant share of the total exports of these regional agreements 
towards the ROW. 
42 For a study of the different rates of the regional preferential tariffs and of the CET implemented by the members of the 
UDEAC, cf. Decaluwe et al. (1997). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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monetary component had a TC effect since the beginning of the period, it is during the 1980’s that this 
effect gained importance
43, until it totally offset the TD effect of the preferential tariff component.   
 
At the very beginning of the 1990’s, the UEMOA generated a global net TC (import 
coefficient non-significantly different from zero), the currency union’s TC offsetting the preferential 
trade agreement’s TD. However, over the same period, a strong global TD once again accompanied 
the CEMAC’s increase in intra-regional trade, the currency union’s TC dampening only a small part of 
the preferential trade agreement’s TD. 
 
Hence, with respect to the evolution of trade between the unions and the ROW, we note 
once again the double influence, over each three-year period, of the two aspects of the regionalisation. 
However, as for intra-regional trade, the impact of the monetary component is more important during 
periods of international monetary instability. Moreover, we find again the conclusion that monetary 
unions generate TC (see section 4), compensating (at least in part) for the TD generated by the 
preferential tariff component. 
 
5.3. Other Preferential Trade Agreements. 
 
The importance of the common currency is emphasized, once again, by comparison with the other 
regional agreements, in particular with ECOWAS, a preferential trade agreement which encompasses 
the UEMOA countries. 
 
Insert figures 6-8 here: Evolution of RTA dummies over 1962-1996 
 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS):  
 
                                                           
43 As noted previously in figure 5, the exchange rate volatility was higher in the 1980s for the “world” whereas it remained 
relatively stable in the case of the UEMOA and the CEMAC members with the ROW. Hence, the members of the UEMOA CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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The ECOWAS was operational in 1977, but until 1989 the members focused mainly on 
the implementation of regional institutions and on the ratification of protocols. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that, in fig.6, the agreement had no effect on its members’ trade for the initial years. After 
the Dakar meeting in 1979, some customs tariff reductions were implemented
44, which can explain the 
slight increase in intra-trade observed for 1983-1988.
45 The scheme of liberalization really started in 
1990 and led to a small increase in intra-trade with a net TC, due to a jointly small decrease in the 
external customs tariffs and intra-RTA tariffs, because of the structural adjustment policy implemented 
in most of the member states of the ECOWAS at this period. However, from 1990, there was a 
constant export diversion. 
These results on intra-trade, significant since the 1980s, were more likely due to exports 
to UEMOA members from ECOWAS neighbouring countries, the latter looking for convertible CFA 
francs. This effect is all the more likely than during the 1980s Nigeria faced a severe balance of 
payment crisis and set up rigorous exchange controls leading traders to look for CFA francs through 
cheap exports to neighbouring CFA countries
46. But, when few months before the devaluation, the two 
CFA monetary union central banks decided to no longer change CFA notes presented outside the two 
respective unions, the incentive given to the Nigerian traders to export to the CFA countries was 
dampened
47. This can explain the fall in the intra-CEDEAO trade since 1994 (αI non-significant for 
1995-1996). 
 
Southern African Development Community (SADC):  
 
The SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) was created in 
1980, partly to counter the regional influence of South Africa. In our estimation, we introduce the sub-
period before the creation of the agreement: none of the RTA dummy coefficients was significant for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and the CEMAC actually benefited from an increasing relative advantage in trade with ROW during the 1980’s. 
44Details in Jebuni et al. (1997).  
45 These results are similar to those of Ogunkula (1994) and Elbadawi (1997). 
46This effect is not really controlled for by the RER variable, since this is calculated from only the official rate of exchange 
and does not take into account the level of the black market rate (which strongly depreciated with regard to the official one). 
For more details, see Guillaumont P., and Guillaumont S. (1991), p.40 
47 For more details, see Hugon (1999). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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1977-1979. During the period 1980-1986, there was an increase in intra-SADCC trade and imports 
TD. Then, we note a stagnation of these phenomena. In 1992, a treaty enhanced the SADCC 
(becoming the SADC) and thus intra-trade
48 with a cease in imports diversion. Nevertheless, the 
exports of the SADC toward the ROW, which were significantly above the norm during the 1980s, 
decreased during this period.  
Our conclusions concerning this agreement have to be attenuated since we have no 
bilateral trade data for Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland (these countries are not dissociated 
from South Africa in the COMTRADE database). Hence, the intra-SADC dummy does not capture 
these countries until 1994, at the same time as South Africa. As countries have important trading 
relations with the other members of the SADC, the results are quite difficult to interpret.
 49  
 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA): 
 
Officially created in 1981, the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Area 
(preferential trade agreement) became operational in 1984. None of the coefficients reflecting this 
agreement were significant before 1988. Actually, the liberalization within this agreement was delayed 
due to difficulties in the negotiations (as for the ECOWAS, this agreement concerns very different 
countries, a fact which has slowed the applications). The regional institutions only began to really 
work from the end of the 1980’s. Added to the first reductions in the customs tariffs on intra-regional 
trade, this allowed an increase in intra-trade from 1989, but a decrease in trade with the ROW.
50 The 
revision of the treaty in 1993 (beginning of the COMESA) intensified the increase of intra-regional 
trade, but also the imports and exports TD. 
 
                                                           
48 This result is similar to that of Subramanian and Tamirisa (2001) and Lyakurwa (1996), who emphasize that intra-SADC 
trade was positive and increased between 1990 and 1997. 
49 For example, the strong increase of intra-trade observed since 1994 is certainly due to the entry of South Africa (and hence 
of the four countries linked to it) in the intra-SADC dummy. This problem of data can also explain the decrease in trade with 
the ROW. 
50 Elbadawi (1997) has similar conclusions for the period 1986-1990. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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6.   CONCLUSION 
 
Given the interest of Sub-Saharan countries for regional integration, it is useful to analyse 
the trade evolution of their member countries to determine whether or not this trade increased and, in 
this case, if the underlying effect is TC or TD. Actually, if TD dominates, this can worsen 
competitiveness problems of the member countries of the regional agreement and increase the 
divergence between the countries (see Venables, 1999, for the UEMOA). Moreover, Sub-Saharan 
Africa is a particularly interesting field of analysis as two kinds of agreements may enhance its 
regional trade: currency unions and preferential trade agreements. Hence, we can try to assess the 
respective impact of each component on the trade between members and with the ROW. 
For each African regional agreement, on average during its implementation period, the 
coefficient reflecting the intra-regional trade is positive and significant (except for COMESA): 
members of the UEMOA, CEMAC and SADC trade more than 3 times more among themselves than 
predicted by the gravity equation and around only 1.2 times more for members of ECOWAS. The 
breakdown of the impact of the preferential trade agreement and the currency union reveals that 
around half of this average additive intra-UEMOA trade can be attributed to the preferential trade 
agreements (and 56% in the case of intra-CEMAC) and half to the common currency. Hence, except 
for the case of the SADC, a regional agreement with both a trade and a monetary component is the 
most efficient in increasing intra-regional trade. This holds even if we only consider the impact of 
preferential tariffs. This additional impact of the preferential trade component, when combined with a 
monetary union, can be due either to an overestimation of the preferential trade agreement 
coefficients, which capture some trade-enhancing effects of a currency union (such as the lower 
transaction costs), or to the fact that a currency union and preferential trade agreement may mutually 
reinforce their impact, especially if we consider the sequence of the integration, with first the 
implementation of the monetary unions before the tariff reduction (and then, some impediments to the 
regional integration success, as the competitive devaluation, are eliminated). 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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A more detailed analysis, based on the evolution of the regional dummy coefficients, reveals 
that, firstly, the Sub-Saharan African regional agreements generated a significant increase in intra-
regional trade
51, but mainly trough trade diversion during the first years of the agreements. Afterwards, 
the UEMOA and the SADC succeeded in generating net trade creation with an increase in the 
propensity to import from the rest of the World. But in the CEMAC and the COMESA, trade diversion 
continued over the whole period. In the case of the UEMOA and the CEMAC, the evolution of the 
currency union relative advantage (in terms of relative stability of the nominal exchange rate of 
member countries) generated a significant trade creation, which dampened the large trade diversion 
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Table 1: Results for global regional dummies of the panel estimation (1962-1996) 
Variables Mijt 
  (1) (2) 
ln Yit  0.96**  54.3  0.95**  53.5 
ln Yjt  1.15**  72.8  1.14**  72.6 
ln Nit  0.32**  11.4  0.32**  11.5 
ln Njt  -0.38**  -14.8  -0.39**  -15.2 
ln DISTij  -1.23**  -45.7  -1.22**  -45.6 
ln  i DIST   0.7**  9.6  0.67**  9.2 
Lij  0.91**  7.2  0.42**  3.3 
Ei  -0.03  -0.5  -0.10  -1.7 
Ej  -0.31**  -5.6  -0.31**  -5.7 
ln INit  0.04**  4.9  0.04**  4.8 
ln INjt  0.03**  6.3  0.03**  6.2 
ln RERijt  -0.01**  -6.4  -0.01*  -6.8 
PRES  0.034**  15.7  0.03**  16.1 
DD  0.17*  2.5  0.18**  2.7 
PAt  0.50**  48.3  0.50**  48.3 
Volijt      -0.494**  -13.1 
YL  0.83**  4.9  0.48**  4.5 
ANDEAN intra  1.57**  4.3  1.55**  4.3 
ANDEAN imports from ROW  -1.19**  -13.5  -1.21**  -13.8 
ANDEAN exports to ROW  -0.26**  -3.0  -0.26**  -3.0 
MERCOSUR intra  1.48**  14.5  1.49**  14.6 
MERCOSUR imports from ROW  -1.24**  -12.8  -1.25**  -13.1 
MERCOSUR exports to ROW  0.66**  3.3  0.62**  3.1 
ASEAN intra  1.29**  3.4  1.26**  4.0 
ASEAN imports from ROW  1.44**  12.6  1.42**  12.5 
ASEAN exports to ROW  2.60**  14.7  2.60**  14.7 
CEMAC intra  1.18**  2.4  0.79**  2.5 
CEMAC imports from ROW  -0.56**  -5.1  -0.76**  -7.1 
CEMAC exports to ROW  -0.34**  -3.2  -0.31**  -2.9 
UEMOA intra  1.14**  4.0  0.76**  3.1 
UEMOA imports from ROW  -0.47**  -3.8  -0.65**  -7.3 
UEMOA exports to ROW  -0.27**  -3.9  -0.39**  -4.2 
ECOWAS intra  a)   0.20*  2.0  0.17  1.4 
ECOWAS imports from ROW  0.48**  3.2  0.48**  3.1 
ECOWAS exports to ROW  -0.42**  -4.0  -0.43**  -4.2 
SADC intra  1.29**  5.5  1.28**  4.6 
SADC imports from ROW  -0.60**  -4.8  -0.59**  -4.8 
SADC exports to ROW  0.34**  3.0  0.34**  3.1 
COMESA intra  b) 0.43  1.6  0.42  1.6 
COMESA imports from ROW  0.02  0.2  0.01  0.1 
COMESA exports to ROW  -1.4**  -13.0  -1.43**  -13.1 
Number of obs (NT)  225 452  225 452 
Number of bilateral (N)  13 925  13 925 
R² 0.59  0.59 
Hausman test   932.7**  chi-2(26) 929.4**    chi-2(27) 
Test of over-identification  5.7        chi-2(20)  6.2        chi-2(21) 
** and * significant at 1% and 5% respectively (t-student is presented next to correspondent coefficient). 
The estimation method is the Hausman-Taylor, with variables Yit, Yjt, Pit, Pjt, INit and INjt as endogenous. 
a) respectively without trade intra-UEMOA, without imports of UEMOA from ROW and without export of UEMOA toward ROW; 
b) respectively without trade intra-SADC, without imports of SADC from ROW and without export of SADC toward ROW. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the intra-UEMOA 
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Fig. 3. Evolution of the UEMOA imports 
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the intra-CEMAC 









1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992
RA PTA
 
Fig. 4. Evolution of the CEMAC 
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Fig. 6. Evolution of the ECOWAS 











Fig. 8. Evolution of the COMESA 
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Appendices to 
“AFRICAN REGIONAL AGREEMENTS: THEIR IMPACT ON TRADE WITH OR 




  A.1. : Definition of the regional agreements studied       
 
ECOWAS SADC COMESA  CEMAC  UEMOA  ANDEAN  MERCO 
SUR  ASEAN 
1962      1962 (UDE)  1962 (UDAO)     
      Congo  Burkina Faso       
       Central African.Rep. Côte d’Ivoire       
      Gabon  Mali       
       Chad  Niger       
       Cameroon (61)  Senegal       
1964       1964 (UDEAC)  Mauritania       
      Congo         
       Central African         
1966      Gabon  1966(UDEAO)      
      Burkina Faso       
     
Chad (absent de 1968 à 
1984)  Côte d’Ivoire       
1969      Cameroon  Mali  1969     
      Niger  Bolivia     
     
Equatorial Guinea 
(83)  Senegal  Chile     
        Mauritania  Colombia     
1973        1973 (CEAO) Ecuador     
        Benin (84)  Peru     
1975  1975       Burkina Faso  Venezuela     
1980  Benin  1980(SADCC)      Côte d’Ivoire       
1984  Burkina Faso  Angola  1984(PTA)   Mali       
  Cape Verde  Botswana  Angola    Niger       
  Ivory Coast  Malawi  Burundi    Senegal       
  Gambia  Mozambique  Comoros     Mauritania       
  Ghana  Namibia (90)  Djibouti           
  Guinea  Lesotho  Ethiopia            
  Swaziland  Kenya            
 
Guinea- 
Bissau  Tanzania  Lesotho            
  Liberia  Zambia  Malawi           
  Mali  Zimbabwe  Mauritius           
  Mauritania    Mozambique           
  Niger    Rwanda           
  Nigeria    Somalia            
1991  Senegal    Sudan        1991   
  Sierra Leone    Swaziland        Argentina   
1992  Togo  1992 (SADC)  Tanzania        Brazil  1992 
    Mauritius (95)  Uganda        Uruguay  Indonesia
    Zambia        Paraguay  Singapore
1994   
South Africa 
(94)  Zimbabwe  1994(CEMAC)  1994(UEMOA)     Philippines 
      1993   Congo  Benin       Malaysia 
      (COMESA)  Central African Rep. Burkina Faso      Thailand 
      Eritrea  Gabon  Côte d’Ivoire       
      Madagascar  Chad   Mali        
      Namibia  Cameroon  Niger       
      Seychelles  Senegal       
1996       
Equatorial Guinea  
Togo       
Countries written in italic are not available as reporter countries in COMTRADE. For example, bilateral 
trade of Lesotho, Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland and South Africa is not desegregated in this data set. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
   
A.2. : Sources and data definition 
 
Mijt   : COMTRADE, total bilateral imports of country i from country j at time t. This 
variable is in current dollar so it has been divided by an index of the unit value of 
imports, taken from IMF, to obtain a real flow of trade.  
 
Yi(j)t   : CD-ROM WDI, World Bank 1999, GDP of country i at time t in constant $ 1995. 
 
Ni(j)t   : CD-ROM WDI, World Bank 1999, total population of country i at time t. 
 
DISTij   : Data for distance are extracted from the software developed by the company CVN. 
The distance is measured in kilometers between the main economic city of the country 
i and that of country j and orthodromic, i.e. taking into account the sphericity of Earth. 
 
Lij   :  Dummy equal to one if the countries i and j share a common land border, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Ei(j)   : Dummy equal to one if the country i is landlocked (i.e. do not have a direct access to 
the sea), 0 otherwise. 
 
INi(j)t   : This index is built using 4 variables from the database constructed by Canning 
(1996): the number of kilometer of roads, of paved roads, of railways, and the number 
of telephone sets/lines per capita of country i (j) at time t. The first three variables are 
divided by the land area (WB, 1999) to obtain a density. Thus, each variable obtained 
is normalized to have a same mean equal to one and an arithmetic average is 
calculated (similar computation as Limao and Venables, 2001). As the final year of the 
data set is 1995, an extrapolation had to be made to cover the year 1996.  
 
i DIST   : average distance of country i to exporter partners, weighted by exporters’ GDP share 
in world GDP (“remoteness” of country i). The ten main trade partners are identified 
for each country according to bilateral flows averaged over 1980-96 (in 
COMTRADE).  
 
RERijt   : We extract from the IFS data set the nominal exchange rate for each country against 
US dollar (NERi/$, country i’s currency value of 1 US$), and the consumption price 
index for country i (CPIi), for each year from 1962 to 1996. If the CPI is not available 
for a country, we consider the GDP deflator of the country. The bilateral real exchange 
rate (RER) is computed as following: RER i/j = (CPIj) / (CPIi) . (NERi/$ / NERj/$ ), 
where i is the importing country and j the exporting one. For each pair of countries, 
we specify the RER such as its mean over the period is zero.  
 
PRES : number of years of presence of the couple ij’s in the sample; 
DD : takes the value 1 if the couple ij is observed during the entire period (62-96), 0 
otherwise.  
PAt  : takes the value 1 if the couple ij was present in t-1 (PA0=0 by hypothesis). 
 
VOLijt   : volatility of the nominal exchange rate between i and j at time t, measured by the 
standard deviation of the first-difference of the monthly bilateral nominal exchange 
rate (in logarithm) for the year preceding period t: measure of volatility within the year 
t-1. VOLijt = [ (1/n-1) Σm(∆lnNERij, m, t-1 – ∆lnNERij, ., t-1)²]
1/2, n=12, ∀m=1..n, ∀i,j,t; 
VOL2ijt  : standard deviation of the level of the exchange rate (in log) during the preceding 
years, VOLijt = [ (1/n-1) Σm(lnNERij, m, t-1 – lnNERij, ., t-1)²]
1/2 , n=12, ∀m=1..n, ∀i,j,t; 
VOL3ijt  : standard deviation of the first-difference of the monthly bilateral nominal exchange 
rate (in log) in the five years preceding t (so from t-5 to t-1), as Rose (2000). CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
   
A.3. : Derivation of the gravity model. 
 
As in Deardorff (1998), assume each country i is specialized in a single commodity, with a 
representative consumer maximizing a homothetic utility function: 
 
1 1











∑      (A1) 
 
where σ is the common elasticity of substitution between any pair of countries’ products subject 
(σ>0), and bj=bi, ∀i,j guarantees symmetry and a single price for each product variety. Product 
differentiation is at the national level (rather than at the firm level as in the monopolistic 
competition version), and CES preferences (rather than Cobb-Douglas) implies that bilateral 
trade decreases with distance. Each consumer Maximization of (A1) subject to the budget 













       (A2) 
 
where 










 ∑      (A3) 
 
is the CES price aggregator in country i associated with the minimization of expenditures in the 
utility maximization problem and pi is the price in the country of destination i facing consumers.  
Assume that the relationship between the price in the country of origin j, pj, and the country of 
destination i, pi is given by : 
 
ij i j i j pp e θ =          ( A 4 )  
In (A4), eij represents the nominal bilateral exchange rate and θij the transport costs function 
between i and j. This term is usually proxy by the distance between the two countries. 
 
To get the standard gravity-based model, assume balanced trade and let γj=Yj/Y
W be the share of 
country j in world income, Y
W. Expenditures of all countries i on the good produced in j are 
ij i
i
pC ∑ . Then, Yj= ij i
i
pC ∑  and substituting the value of Cji from (A2) into this expression 
gives: CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
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         ∑∑
  ∀i,j,h=1..n     (A6) 
 
So, according to (A6), the volume of imports (Mij) of i from j depends on: 
i)  the product of partners' income, YiYj, relative to the world income, Y
W; 
ii)  the transport costs between i and j, θij, 
iii)  the bilateral nominal exchange rate, eij, and on prices in the exporting country, pj, 
relative to the CES price aggregator,  i P , in the importing country. As price indexes are 
not available for our sample, this term is proxied by the bilateral real exchange rate, 
RERij. 
iv)  in the last term, γh represents the share of country h in world income and  i P  can be 
considered as a “CES index of country i’s barriers-to-trade factors” as an importer (see 
Deardorff, 1998). Hence, a variable of average distance of the importing country from 
its main partners,  i DIST , weighted by exporters’ GDP share in world GDP, has to be 
introduced to take account of “the relative distance of i from suppliers” (the 
“remoteness”).  
 
Hence, using these proxies and the log-linear form of (A6) , we obtain: 
 
lnMij= κ0 + κ1 lnYi+ κ2 lnYj+ κ3 lnθij+ κ4 ln i DIST +κ5 lnRERij+ηij  
with κ1= κ2=1, κ3=-σ<0, κ4>0 and κ5<0. 
 CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
   
A.4. : Countries in the sample. 
 
OECD  Sub-Saharan       
Africa  
Latin America and 
the Caribbean  
Asia and the 
Pacific 
Others 
Australia Angola  Argentina  Bangladesh  Albania 
Austria South  Africa*  Bahamas  Brunei  Armenia 
Burundi Barbados  Bhutan  Azerbaijan  Belgium + 
Luxembourg  Benin Belize  China  Bulgaria 
Canada Burkina  Faso  Bolivia  Fiji  Belarus 
Germany  Central African Rep.  Brazil  Hong Kong  Czech Rep. 
Denmark Côte  d’Ivoire  Chile  Indonesia  Algeria 
Spain Cameroon Colombia  India  Saudi  Arabia 
Finland Congo  Costa  Rica  Cambodia  Egypt 
France  Comoros  Dominican Rep.  Lao PDR  Estonia 
United Kingdom  Cape Verde  Dominica  Macao  Georgia 
Ireland Djibouti  Ecuador  Mongolia  Greece 
Iceland  Ethiopia + Eritrea  Grenada  Malaysia 
Italy Gabon  Guatemala  Nepal 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Japan Ghana  Guyana  Pakistan  Hungary 
Korea, Rep.  Guinea  Honduras  Philippines  Iran 
United States  Guinea-Bissau  Haiti  Papua New Guinea Israel 
Netherlands Gambia  Jamaica  Singapore  Jordan 
Norway  Equatorial Guinea  Mexico  Salomon Islands  Kazakstan 
New Zealand  Kenya  Nicaragua Thailand  Kyrgyz  Rep. 
Portugal Madagascar  Panama  Vietnam  Kuwait 
Sweden Mali  Peru  Western  Samoa  Lithuania 
Mozambique Paraguay Sri  Lanka Latvia  Switzerland + 
Liechtenstein  Mauritania El  Salvador  Tonga Macedonia 
 Mauritius  Suriname  Kiribati  Morocco 
  Malawi  Trinidad and Tobago Vanuatu  Malta 
 Niger  Uruguay    Oman 
  Nigeria  St. Vincent and    Poland 
  Rwanda  The Grenadines    Romania 
 Sudan  Venezuela    Russian Federation 
 Senegal  St. Lucia   Slovenia 
  Sierra Leone  Antigua and    Slovak  Rep. 
  Sao Tomé and Principe  Barbuda   Syrian  Rep. 
 Seychelles  St. Kitts and    Tajikistan 
  Somalia Nevis    Turkmenistan 
 Chad      Tunisia 
 Togo      Turkey 
 Tanzania     Ukraine 
 Uganda      Uzbekistan 
 Zaire       
 Zambia       
 Zimbabwe       
Countries written in italic are not available as reporter countries in COMTRADE (only as partners).  
* South Africa includes bilateral trade of the group of countries: South Africa + Lesotho + Botswana + Namibia + 
Swaziland. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2003.11 
   




Complete sample  intra- DC  intra- SSA 
ln Yit 0 ,99** 59,3  0,92** 27,4  0,90**  5,2 
ln Yjt 1,14** 84,6  1,10** 28,3  1,14**  6,1 
ln Nit 0.13** 11.4  0,29** 6,1  0,08  0,8 
ln Njt -0.65** -22.7  -0,38** -7,8  -0,36**  3,8 
ln DISTij -1,17** -44,3  -1,54** -33,7  -1,63**  -40,0 
ln  i DIST 0,75**  15,6  0,7**  5,2  0,51**  4,1 
Lij 0,92** 7,7  0,94** 6,1  0,98**  4,9 
Ei -0,16** -3,7  -0,15* -2,1  -0,22**  -2,6 
Ej -0,49* -2,0  -0,55** 4,0  -0,71**  -4,1 
ln INit 0,04** 4,2  0,06** 5,1  0,10**  7,5 
ln INjt 0,03** 7,2  0,04** 5,3  0,05**  4,6 
ln RERijt -0,01** -4,0  -0,01* -4,1  -0,03*  -2,0 
PRES 0,04** 18,1  0,02** 6,0  0,06**  5,5 
DD 0,02 0,2  0,20 1,1  0,52  1,6 
PAt 0,49** 49,0  0,49** 30,9  0,43**  10,2 
YL 0,82** 7,4       
EU intra  0.31* 2.2       
EU imports from ROW  0.24**  3.2         
EU exports to ROW  0.36**  5.1         
ANDEAN intra  1,11** 9,4  1,89** 4,8     
ANDEAN imports from ROW  -1,17**  -10,5  -1,02**  -8,8     
ANDEAN exports to ROW  -0,79**  -4,2  -0,18  -1,5     
MERCOSUR intra  1,42** 14,9  1,55** 14,1     
MERCOSUR imports from ROW  -1,91**  -17,6  -1,62**  -15,7     
MERCOSUR exports to ROW  0,89**  5,4  1,51**  5,9     
ASEAN intra  1,44** 3,2  1,09** 3,7     
ASEAN imports from ROW  1,27**  12,1  1,55**  7,5     
ASEAN exports to ROW  2,56**  14,4  2,84**  10,8     
CEMAC intra  1,16** 2,6  1,22** 2,6  1,10*  2,1 
CEMAC imports from ROW  -0,52**  -5,1  -0,62  -4,1  -0,65**  -2,6 
CEMAC exports to ROW  -0,35**  -3,3  0,49**  3,4  0,70*  2,4 
UEMOA intra  1,12** 3,3  1,38** 3,8  1,35**  3,4 
UEMOA imports from ROW  -0,52**  -5,5  -0,51**  -4,1  -0,80**  -3,5 
UEMOA exports to ROW  -0,32**  -3,3  -0,20  -2,6  -0,24**  -3,2 
ECOWAS intra  a)   0,32* 2,0  0,31** 2,0  0,29**  3,6 
ECOWAS imports from ROW  0,44**  3,5  0,33**  2,3  0,47**  2,6 
ECOWAS exports to ROW  -0,42**  -4,1  -0,43**  -3,1  -0,78**  -2,9 
SADC intra  1,31** 3,4  1,33** 3,2  2,10**  5,4 
SADC imports from ROW  -0,57**  -4,6  -0,42**  -2,7  -0,67*  -2,4 
SADC exports to ROW  0,34**  3,0  0,47**  3,2  0,56*  2,0 
COMESA intra  b) 0 ,47 1,8  0,42 1,5  0,58*  2,0 
COMESA imports from ROW  0,07  0,6  -0,05  0,4  0,06  0,2 
COMESA exports to ROW  -1,45**  -13,8  -1,5**  -10,5  -1,62**  -5,2 
Number of obs (NT)  240 691  91 050   12 012 
Number of bilateral (N)  14 387  7 305  931 
R²   0,64 0,56  0,59 
** and * significant at 1% and 5% respectively ( t-student is presented next to correspondent coefficient). 
The estimation method is one of Hausman-Taylor, with variables Yit, Yjt, Pit, Pjt, INit and INjt as endogenous. 
a) respectively without trade intra-UEMOA, without imports of UEMOA from ROW and without export of UEMOA toward ROW 
b) respectively without trade intra-SADC, without imports of SADC from ROW and without export of SADC toward ROW 